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Abstract
We analyze the role of bankers on the boards of German non-financial companies for the 
period from 1994 to 2005. We find that banks that are represented on a firm’s board 
promote their own business as lenders and as M&A advisors. They also seem to act as 
financial experts who help firms to obtain funding, especially in difficult times. We find 
little evidence that bankers monitor management and suggest that bankers on the board 
cause a decline in the valuations of non-financial firms. Banks’ equity ownership declined 
sharply during our sample period and the German financial system lost some of its formerly 
distinctive features. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we document how German banks affect non-financial companies through board 
representation during the period from 1994 to 2005. Our main result is that banks benefit from 
being present on the boards of non-financial firms: they increase their lending to these firms 
and to other firms in the same industry, and they are more likely to be chosen as an advisor if 
these firms undertake an acquisition. We also present evidence that banks help non-financial 
firms to overcome financing restrictions. By contrast, they do not act in the interest of equity 
holders – even if they themselves hold an equity stake. Overall, having a banker on the board 
is associated with lower performance, and we argue that the causality is likely to run from 
bank presence to low performance. 
The relationship between banks and non-financial companies in Germany has been the subject 
of continuing debate in the literature. Earlier comparative analyses in the 1980s and before 
have focused more on the advantages of the German bank-based system compared to the 
Anglo-Saxon market-based financial system. Banks were credited with providing a long-term 
view on investment, providing expertise to companies as well as improved corporate 
governance.
1
 Many of these commentators inferred that the growth performance of post-war 
Germany was directly related to the superiority of the German financial system, characterized 
by house banks, representation of banks on companies’ supervisory boards, and the ability of 
banks to vote the shares of their customers. The more recent literature provides a less 
favorable perspective and emphasizes the lower quality of governance in civil law countries 
like Germany (La Porta et al., 1997). 
In the intervening period, the gap between both systems has narrowed through institutional 
changes on both sides of the Atlantic. In Germany, legislators enacted a sequence of laws to 
enhance corporate governance by outlawing insider trading, increasing disclosure standards, 
and introducing a new regulator for financial markets. The most significant institutional 
change for our study was a change in capital gains taxation that became effective in 2002, 
which allowed banks to divest their equity holdings without paying capital gains taxes. This 
change in legislation substantially reduced the costs of selling equity stakes, particularly those 
stakes banks held for a long time and with an accordingly low tax base. Mostly because of 
this legal change, average equity ownership of banks in non-financial companies in Germany 
declined by a factor of 10, from 4.1% in 1994 to 0.4% in 2005. At the same time, the number 
                                                          
1  See for example Mayer (1988). A good survey of these opinions as well as an early critique of these views is 
offered by Edwards and Fischer (1994), in particular in their chapter 1. Jensen (1989) argues that LBOs and 
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of board seats held by bankers decreases only moderately from 9.6% to 5.6%. The number of 
boards where bankers are represented declined from 51% to 33% and seems to stabilize at 
around that value, which is also in line with findings for the U.S. 
The increased disparity between equity ownership and board representation is puzzling and 
provides a backdrop against which we evaluate several hypotheses that explain the presence 
and effect of bankers on the boards of non-financial firms. We investigate three general 
hypotheses that have been developed in the literature to explain the presence of bankers on the 
boards of non-financial companies, in particular: (1) Bankers provide capital markets 
expertise and act as financial experts; (2) they monitor non-financial companies either 
because these companies are borrowers or because they hold an equity stake; (3) they promote 
their own business, either as commercial bankers (by increasing their lending to these firms or 
to other firms in the same industry) or as investment bankers (by selling more advisory 
services). We develop these hypotheses in more detail in the following section. Finally, we 
are also interested in the relationship between banks’ board representation and firm value. 
A major challenge for our study is to identify the direction of causality, because virtually all 
variables in our analysis are arguably endogenous. The negative relation between bank 
presence and performance, for instance, can be explained in three ways: (1) bankers cause low 
performance, (2) firms with low performance appoint bankers to their board, or (3) some 
additional variable (e.g., industry or corporate governance) affects performance and the 
attractiveness of board seats for bankers. To address the endogeneity problem, we take 
advantage of the time dimension in our panel data set, lag the explanatory variables in our 
regressions and include the lagged dependent variable as an additional right-hand-side 
variable. Hence, we only analyze the explanatory power of the independent variables beyond
the explanatory power included in lagged values of the dependent variable itself. This 
identifies causality in the sense of Granger (1969). We also use fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.
Our analysis is based on a unique, hand-collected panel data set for all firms that were among 
the largest 100 listed companies in Germany for any year in our sample period from 1994 to 
2005. This provides us with a data set for 137 non-financial firms and 11 banks. We also use 
data from Deutsche Bundesbank, which contains the total amount of loans that is provided by 
a given bank to a given firm. We find strong evidence that bankers on the board of German 
non-financial firms promote their own business: Banks lend more to the firms on whose 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
similar going private transactions move the U.S. system towards the successful post-war Japanese system of 
corporate financing, which he also characterizes by close links between banks and non-financial companies. 
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boards they are represented, and they tend to lend more to other firms in the same industry. 
Also, banks are more likely to be chosen as M&A advisor when they are represented on the 
board. We also find substantial evidence that bankers are capital market experts who help 
companies to acquire external finance more easily or to fund capital expenditures. By 
contrast, we do not find any evidence (and sometimes even contradicting evidence) to support 
the notion that bankers on the board act as monitors. They do not act in their interests as 
equity-holders, a role that largely disappears during our sample period. Neither do they seem 
to protect their interests as lenders. 
Finally, we investigate the relation between bank representation and firm value and find that 
this is consistently negative. We establish that performance deteriorates after bankers have 
been appointed to the board, which suggests that bankers cause low performance. We 
conclude that the board relationships between banks and non-financial firms are beneficial for 
the banks, while they are potentially harmful for non-financial firms. Our results suggest that 
German universal banks do not behave much differently from U.S. specialist banks: Their role 
as a shareholder in non-financial firms has disappeared and they are mainly interested in 
promoting their lending and investment banking business.
2
 As a result, the German financial 
system has lost some of its formerly distinctive features. 
The argument proceeds as follows. We provide a literature review and develop our 
hypotheses in Section 2. Section 3 describes the main features of the relevant institutional 
environment, the construction of our data set, and the methods we use. Section 4 discusses the 
factors that influence the presence of bankers on the supervisory boards of non-financial 
firms. Section 5 asks what role bankers actually perform on the boards,. Section 6 addresses 
the question whether firms benefit from having a banker on their board, and Section 7 
concludes.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Several mutually non-exclusive hypotheses regarding bank representation have been 
advanced in the literature (see Kroszner and Strahan (2001), and Byrd and Mizruchi (2005)). 
We develop three hypotheses here in detail: (1) the argument that bankers are capital market 
experts, (2) that they act as monitors, and (3) that they promote their own business. 
The capital markets expertise hypothesis emphasizes the demand side and therefore the 
characteristics of companies that actively seek bank representation on their boards. According 
                                                          
2  Similar results have been found for the U.S. by Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Güner, Malmendier and Tate 
(2008). 
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to this hypothesis, bankers are appointed to the boards of non-financial companies as financial 
experts who help the company to obtain funding. Bankers on the board overcome adverse 
selection and credit rationing problems so that companies that have a banker on their board 
should use more bank lending and increase their leverage.
3
Monitoring. Depending on the type of investment, there are two variants of the monitoring 
hypothesis. First, according to the equity monitoring hypothesis, bankers on boards simply 
represent their interests as shareholders, just as any other block owner may do. The second 
variant of the monitoring hypothesis, the debt monitoring hypothesis holds that bankers wish 
to safeguard their existing loans and want to get involved in those companies where their 
loans have a significant probability to be distressed in the future.
4
 Then bank representation 
on the board allows bankers to influence financial and investment policies to protect the 
interests of the firm’s existing creditors and becomes a substitute for loan covenants. 
Banks’ promotion of their own business. The German proxy voting rules allow banks to 
vote the shares of their depositors. Since large fractions of the shares of German companies 
are deposited with the large banks, this permits banks to elect their own managers to corporate 
boards independently of their own equity stakes. As a result, banks may use board 
representation in order to promote their own business. We distinguish between three sub-
hypotheses. First, bankers might seek board seats in order to sell debt to the firm (debt selling 
hypothesis).
5
 In particular, they may wish to better screen loan applications and to obtain 
inside information on the financial status of (potential) borrowers. 
A closely related argument, the industry expertise hypothesis states that bankers may derive 
industry knowledge from their board seats, which then allows them to condition their lending 
decisions to firms in that industry more accurately. For example, banks may be willing to 
advance credit lines to companies only if they learn sufficiently quickly if lending conditions 
in the industry deteriorate, so that they can make timely decisions to call back these credit 
lines.
Finally, banks may also sell other services to their clients and we label this hypothesis selling 
M&A advisory services (e.g., Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008). The firms in our sample 
                                                          
3  Ramirez (1995), Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), and Ciamarra (2006) provide evidence for the capital markets 
expertise hypothesis for U.S. firms. Morck and Nakamura (1999) provide supporting evidence for Japan. 
Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) list a number of sources that develop the capital markets expertise hypothesis (pp. 
229-30). 
4  See Fama (1985) and James (1987). Morck and Nakamura (1999) show that bankers on the boards of 
Japanese firms primarily act in the interest of creditors. 
5  Booth and Deli (1999) find that the presence of commercial bankers on the boards of U.S. companies is 
associated with higher aggregate debt levels. 
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are large and undertake mergers and acquisitions on a regular basis to complement their 
operations. Some of the banks represented on the boards of these firms also own investment-
banking divisions, which typically contribute significantly to the overall profitability of 
universal banks in Germany. 
The literature has also discussed the conflicts of interest hypothesis, which says that bankers 
are more likely to seek representation on boards where they do not jeopardize their position as 
lenders (e.g., Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). In our view, this hypothesis depends on the 
validity of the doctrine of “lender liability” and is therefore specific to institutional contexts 
such as those of the United States, where banks with board representation may be held 
accountable and lose the priority of their debt claims in case of bankruptcy. German law has 
no such provisions, so this hypothesis does not apply. 
Numerous studies have analyzed aspects of the relationship between German banks and 
German non-financial companies. In particular Cable (1985), Gorton and Schmid (2000), 
Edwards and Nibler (2000), and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) reach more benign 
conclusions regarding the role of banks in German corporate governance than our study. To 
the best of our knowledge, Cable (1985) is the earliest paper in this literature. He studies a 
1970 sample of 48 German firms and finds that bank control enhances profitability. He does 
not analyze causality, relies on a small and much earlier sample, and uses a somewhat 
idiosyncratic measure of profitability. Gorton and Schmid (2000) study the effects of bank 
equity control on German firms for two cross-sections and find that bank equity ownership is 
beneficial and that banks appear to be special compared to other shareholders in that they 
positively affect firm performance. However, unlike our study they do not analyze a panel and 
do not include the influence through board membership in their study. Also, as their study 
finds a significant structural break between their 1975 and their 1986 cross-section, it is 
plausible to presume that some of the relationships they describe have changed until 1994, 
when our sample starts. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) reach a similar conclusion to Gorton 
and Schmid, but they use a very different research design. Their sample covers the early 
1990s and therefore overlaps with our sample, but is restricted to mining and manufacturing 
industries and includes smaller and also unlisted firms. Their results are therefore not directly 
comparable to ours. Edwards and Nibler (2000) investigate a cross-section of 156 of the 
largest non-financial German firms and find a positive impact of the equity ownership of the 
top three banks, but they undertake neither causality analysis nor control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and several other effects we include in our model. Boehmer (2000) studies a 
sample of acquisitions and finds that banks only provide benefits to bidding companies when 
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their power is offset by non-bank block holders, which is closer to our findings in a different 
context. Franks and Mayer’s (1998) clinical study of all three hostile takeover attempts in 
post-war Germany also finds evidence that banks do not always act in the interests of 
shareholders. Elston and Goldberg (2003) show that bank influence reduces the level of 
compensation for German executives. Agarwal and Elston (2001) also strike a cautious note 
on the beneficial impact of German banks and find that bank influence does not seem to 
enhance either firms’ profitability or growth, which is also corroborated by a later study by 
Chirinko and Elston (2006). 
3. Institutional Framework, Data and Methods 
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The German board system has some distinct characteristics that differentiate it from the 
systems of most other countries, notably the Anglo-Saxon model. German companies have a 
two-tier board, where the management board (Vorstand) is responsible for the day-to-day 
operations and the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) appoints and supervises the members of 
the management board on behalf of shareholders and the public interest. This structure has 
been mandatory since 1870. Most aspects of the board structure are tightly regulated by the 
German stock corporation act (Aktiengesetz) and other laws, which leave little discretion to 
the company and its charter. In particular, the two boards are personally separated, and 
nobody can be a member of both boards of the same company at the same time. Also, direct 
board interlocks are prohibited so that a member of the management board of company A 
cannot sit on the supervisory board of company B if a management board member of 
company B is sitting on the supervisory board of company A at the same time. Nobody is 
allowed to accumulate more than ten seats on the supervisory boards of different corporations, 
where a chairmanship counts as two board seats for the benefits of this regulation. 
Under applicable German law, in particular the co-determination act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)
the supervisory board has a minimum and a maximum size, which depends on the number of 
employees of the firm, so board size is largely determined by law. We therefore do not use 
this variable in our empirical analysis. The codetermination act also requires that half of all 
board members are worker representatives.
6
 Still, the shareholders of the company retain 
control of the supervisory board because the chairman of the supervisory board, who has the 
casting vote in case of a tie, is appointed by shareholders. The worker representatives are 
                                                          
6  The co-determination act does not apply to smaller companies with less than 2,000 employees, where the 
required proportion of worker representatives is only one third. For 72% of our non-bank firm-year 
observations, the number of employees exceeds 2,000. 
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elected by the company’s workers, and some of them must be union representatives. The 
shareholders’ representatives on the supervisory board are elected by the shareholders’ annual 
general meeting. The supervisory board cannot assume managerial responsibilities, but the 
company’s charter can require that some executive decisions be subject to the supervisory 
board’s approval. 
In January 2002, a capital gains tax reform became effective that was first proposed by the 
federal government in December 1999 and that was formally (and rather unexpectedly) 
finalized by a vote of the upper house (Bundesrat) in July 2000. Realized capital gains from 
the sales of shares in companies were taxable before January 2002 and have been tax-free 
since then. Hence, the reform provided incentives to realize book losses before January 2002 
and to delay the realization of gains until after January 1, 2002. The taxation of capital gains 
was widely perceived as an obstacle to the unraveling of cross shareholdings between German 
companies. 
Another important development during our sample period is the internationalization of the 
German stock market. More and more German companies switched their financial reporting 
from German GAAP to IFRS or U.S. GAAP. While in 1994 all firms in our data set reported 
according to German GAAP, this number falls to 2% in 2005. As German GAAP is more 
conservative than IFRS or U.S. GAAP (see Harris, Lang, and Möller, 1994), we include a 
German GAAP dummy variable in all regressions where the dependent variable is likely to be 
affected by the accounting standard. In addition, we repeat all regressions that include 
accounting variables (as dependent or independent variables) for the smaller sample of all 
firm-year observations with German GAAP reporting. This robustness check does not yield 
substantially different results, so we do not report it in the tables. 
3.2 CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA SET 
We identify all companies that were included in the DAX 100, the index of the top 100 listed 
German companies, at any point in time during the 12-year period from 1994 to 2005. These 
are 167 firms, which we divide into two subsamples. The first subsample comprises 11 banks 
(SIC code 6021) and the second subsample comprises 137 non-banks. Financial services 
companies (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) other than banks are excluded from both 
samples. For all these companies we compile the following data for the years 1994-2005. 
Hoppenstedt company profiles (a periodical similar to Moody’s manuals) gives us the names 
of all members of the management board and the supervisory board, as well as information 
about block holders and the total payments to members of the management board. In those 
cases where Hoppenstedt does not provide certain data, we compiled it from other sources, 
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usually from company reports, which was successful in most cases. We obtain accounting 
data from Worldscope and market data from Datastream. From SDC Platinum we obtain data 
on mergers and acquisitions of our sample firms and the identity of the acquiring firm’s 
advisor. Deutsche Bundesbank provided us with data for individual bank-firm credit 
relationships, which they collect according to Section 14 of the German Banking Act 
(Kreditwesengesetz).
7
 Our final sample consists of 1,388 firm-year observations on non-
financial firms and a further 110 firm-year observations for banks. 
Insert Table I and Table II here. 
Table I provides the definitions of all our variables at the firm-year level and reports their 
respective sources. Table II presents summary statistics for the sample of non-financial firms. 
3.3 TIES BETWEEN BANKS AND NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS 
In order to measure bank influence we need to define a “banker,” which poses some 
difficulties.
8
 It is common practice in Germany that former bank managers become members 
of their company’s supervisory board immediately after their retirement, when a younger 
colleague takes over the top management post. In our view, these retired supervisory board 
members still represent the interests of their former employers. We therefore define that a 
person is a “banker” for all years after he or she joined the management board of a bank. She 
stays a “banker” except if she is appointed to a non-bank’s management board during the 
sample-period. Then we define her status as a “non-banker” from that point onwards. 
We measure bank influence on a company by PercentBankers, which is defined as the ratio of 
bankers to the total number of shareholder representatives on the supervisory board. We focus 
only on shareholder representatives on the supervisory board and disregard worker 
representatives for our purposes. On average, bankers occupy 8.8% of all shareholder 
appointed supervisory board seats, and the median supervisory board in our sample has six 
shareholder representatives (see BoardSize, the mean is 7.1). As a robustness check, we repeat 
our analysis with BankDummy instead of PercentBankers. BankDummy assumes a value of 
                                                          
7  According to Section 14 of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz), German banks have to report on a 
quarterly basis all creditors whose total borrowing volume from the bank exceeds €1.5m. The total credit 
volume also includes bonds issued by the creditor and held by the bank. A bank loan for which two firms are 
liable (e.g., because it is given to a joint venture of the two firms) appears twice in the database. While this 
double counting is a serious limitation of this database in general, it is less important in our case, because we 
are interested in all borrowing relationships a firm has to one of our sample banks. The restriction of the 
database to borrowing in excess of €1.5m should not result in a substantial bias as we consider only large 
firms. We match the Bundesbank and Worldscope data manually based on the names of the firms and banks. 
8  Note that unlike the U.S. literature on the influence of bankers on boards we do not distinguish between 
commercial bankers and investment bankers. Such a distinction is impossible in the German context as 
investment banking services and commercial banking services are offered by the same universal banks. See 
Booth and Deli (1999), Kroszner and Strahan (2001), and Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008). 
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one if at least one member of the supervisory board is a banker, and zero otherwise. In order 
to conserve space, we only report these results if they are qualitatively different from our 
results for PercentBankers.
The average equity ownership of German banks, BankEquity, is only 3.3% during this period, 
again much reduced compared to the 7.3% reported for the earlier sample by Edwards and 
Fischer (1994). The distribution of equity stakes is highly skewed: For only 18% of all our 
firm-year observations, BankEquity is positive and then it is 18.3% on average with a median 
of 13.2%. Therefore, banks hold substantial stakes in a few companies rather than small 
stakes in all of them. 
Insert Table III here. 
The aggregate figures above suggest a substantial loosening of the ties between banks and 
non-banks between the 1970s and the 1990s. We investigate this further in Table III, which 
reports the means of some of the major variables from our data set by year for the subset of 
companies where we have continuous data from 1994 to 2005. This allows us to assess the 
impact of the institutional changes during this period, in particular the reform of corporate 
taxes that became effective at the beginning of 2002. Table III shows that the equity 
ownership of banks in non-financial firms (BankEquity) is stable around 4% from 1994 to 
2001 and then drops to 0.4% by 2005, which reflects a substantial reduction in the number of 
firms where banks hold equity as well as in the average size of the remaining equity stakes.
9
This suggests that banks held shares during the earlier sample period mainly in order to defer 
taxes and not for other economic reasons. We therefore expect that theories trying to explain 
bank shareholdings in non-financial companies will find little support during this period. 
Ownership of other block holders (NonBankEquity) also declines from 55.4% in 1994 to 
47.7%, but the decline is more gradual here and relatively moderate compared to the decline 
of bank equity ownership. This is also reflected in the increase of the free float from 40.5% to 
51.9%, which suggests that the attempts to improve financial market regulation where met 
with some success, at least in terms of the attractiveness of German capital markets for small 
shareholders.
The representation of bankers on boards has declined dramatically over the 1994 to 2005 
period according to both measures, BankDummy and PercentBankers. At the beginning of this 
period, 50.7% of all supervisory boards included a banker compared to only 33.3% twelve 
                                                          
9  The numbers in Tables II and III are not directly comparable because Table III is based on a subsample of 75 
firms for which we have continuous data from 1994-2005. Of these firms, 16 have bank equity investments 
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years later, and the percentage of bankers on boards fell from 9.6% to 5.6% over this period. 
These figures are substantially below the 75% of the top 100 German firms who had a banker 
on their supervisory board in 1974, when bankers held 22.4% of the shareholder seats in a 
comparable sample of companies (Edwards and Fisher, 1994, p. 201). By comparison, in the 
U.S. only about 31.6% of large firms had representatives of banks (commercial or investment 
banks) on their boards.
10
 We interpret this development as part of the continuing unraveling of 
what used to be the distinctly German pattern of corporate governance and bank-firm 
relationships and as support of the notion that the German model converges to the Anglo-
Saxon model. However, the decline in bank representation on boards is not nearly as stark as 
the decline in banks’ equity ownership. Most of the change in board representation happened 
between 2002 and 2004. Board representation stabilized at 31% in 2004 and 2005 in the full 
sample (not shown in the table), which suggests that the weaker decline in board 
representation is not due to a mere time lag. In addition, Table II shows that bankers on the 
board without equity stakes outnumber bankers who represent an equity stake by three to one 
(compare the means of PercentBankersWithEquity and PercentBankersWithoutEquity). 
Hence, board representation and equity ownership are not closely related. 
We do not have data on the proxy voting rights of banks. These voting rights are a specific 
part of German corporate governance that allows banks to vote the shares of their customers 
at shareholder meetings. Data on these voting rights are very expensive to collect because the 
only source are the minutes of the shareholder meetings, which must be filed with the local 
district court where the company is registered. Previous studies have therefore always 
collected only small samples of proxy voting data, and no study has ever compiled a panel.
11
The figures in these studies are not directly comparable, but they agree on the fact that banks’ 
voting power derives to a large extent from their proxy voting rights, and only a small 
proportion of voting rights derives from direct equity ownership. 
3.4 PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND ADDITIONAL VARIABLES 
Our measure of company valuation is Tobin’s Q, which we define as the market value of the 
firm divided by the book value of total assets. The market value of the firm is calculated as 
the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in 1994, of which three remain in 2005. The average size of a stake declines from 19.4% to 9.3% during this 
period. 
10  See Kroszner and Strahan (2001), referring to the Forbes 500 firms in 1992. Similar numbers have been 
reported by Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008). 
11  Edwards and Fischer (1994) report that banks vote 49.45% of the shares of companies in their sample by 
proxy. Gorton and Schmid (2000) have 21% for their 1975 sample and 23% for their 1986 sample. Elsas and 
Krahnen (2004) report an average of 29.5% for a 1990 sample of 65 large firms. 
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We have sufficient balance sheet data for 1,282 firm-years or 92% of our sample and the 
average Q is 1.54 (the median is 1.24, see Table II). Other variables we use to describe 
companies’ performance are the return on assets (defined as EBIT divided by total assets) and 
sales growth. The median company has sales of almost €1.9bn, which shows that our sample 
consists of large companies. 
Data on executive compensation are notoriously scant in Germany and we have no data on 
these variables before 1997. Executive compensation has to be disclosed individually for 
members of the management board only since 2006 and for our sample period, we can only 
compute the average compensation per board member. Table III shows that management 
compensation increases steadily and more than doubles during the nine years for which we 
have data. However, compensation divided by firm value declines by 5% from 1997 to 2005.  
In our analysis, we also look at – and control for – firms’ funding decisions as proxied by 
capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) and the payout ratio, which is the percentage of net 
income paid out to shareholders. In addition to market leverage and book leverage, we use a 
third measure of leverage: LeverageBanks is the ratio of BankDebt to the sum of total debt 
and market capitalization and measures the part of market leverage that is provided by the 
banks in our sample. Due to the double counting problem discussed in Footnote 7, BankDebt
can be overstated and in a few cases, it can be even higher than total debt. This is the reason 
why the maximum of LeverageBanks is bigger than the maximum of LeverageMarket in 
Table II. Apart from this, the numbers are very reasonable: average book leverage is 38%, 
average market leverage is 27%, and average bank leverage is 15%. Finally, we also include 
three variables that proxy for the debt capacity of the firm: interest cover, defined as the ratio 
of EBIT to interest expense, the amount of intangible assets scaled by total assets, and the 
firm’s stock price volatility. 
We use dummy variables for calendar years and for industries. Our industry definition uses 
the definition of prime sectors of the German stock exchange, and we aggregate some sectors 
with a small number of firm-years in our sample to obtain 15 different industries.
12
3.5 METHODS 
Endogeneity is a major problem in our analysis, because firm value, bank involvement, and 
firm policies are likely to be jointly determined. Some of our hypotheses imply that firm value 
                                                          
12  We consolidate media, telecommunications, and transport with consumer, and software with technology. 
This leaves us with 12 non-financial industries (automobiles, basic resources, chemicals, construction, 
consumer, food, healthcare, industrial, machinery, retail, technology, utilities) and three financial industries 
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increases (or decreases) if banks get involved, while other hypotheses state that low-value 
firms actively solicit bank involvement. Similarly, some hypotheses predict that certain firm 
policies (like leverage or capital expenditure) should affect the board representation of 
bankers while other hypotheses imply the opposite direction of causality. We address the 
endogeneity problem in three ways but are aware of the fact that they can only alleviate but 
not completely solve the problem. 
First, all our explanatory variables are lagged by one year in order to remove the 
contemporaneous effect if the explanatory variable is endogenous. Many variables in our 
analysis (including banks’ board representation) are highly correlated over time, so that this 
method is only of limited use here. Second, we include fixed effects that filter out year, 
industry, or firm effects and thereby any unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. 
Third, we also include specifications with the lagged dependent variable as an additional right 
hand side variable: 
1 1α β γ ε− −= + + + kit it k it it
k
y y x . (1) 
This specification is a generalization of differencing the dependent variable, because   is not 
restricted to be equal to one. Formally, specification (1) is a Granger (1969) causality 
regression, which asks whether the lagged independent variables x
k
 have explanatory power 
for the dependent variable y beyond the explanatory power included in lagged values of y
itself. The lagged dependent variable filters out most of the effect of missing variables, which 
will affect yt and yt-1 in equal measure. The main advantage of this approach is that we can 
include the lags of endogenous variables because they are predetermined and need not 
distinguish them from exogenous variables. 
Granger causality regressions are a very conservative method, because they remove much of 
the cross-sectional variation whenever the dependent variable changes only slowly over time. 
We therefore always also report OLS regressions with firm fixed effects and OLS or Tobit 
regressions with industry effects. While these fixed effects regressions do not help much to 
identify the direction of causality, they provide a more complete picture about the association 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. 
Granger causality has a few drawbacks. Jacobs, Leamer, and Ward (1979) show that Granger 
causality is not able to detect the absence of causality, but that it can be used to prove the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(banks, finance, insurance). We need to consolidate industries in order to reduce the potential bias that is 
caused by the use of fixed (industry) effects in Tobit or Granger causality regressions. 
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existence of causality – given that the model is correctly specified. We check for correct 
specification in our analysis in two ways. First, we re-run all Granger causality regressions (1) 
with three lags yit-1, …, yit-3; we do not show the results in the tables as they are not 
substantially different from our main analysis. Typically, we observe an increase in the 
standard errors because we lose an additional 20% of our observations by including more 
lags. Second, we perform a unit-root test for all our dependent variables and find that we can 
reject the hypothesis of a unit-root for all of them (not shown in the tables; see He and 
Maekawa (2001) for a discussion of spurious Granger causality for integrated processes). 
Another problem occurs if one of the variables involves forward-looking behavior. Suppose 
that higher PercentBankers reduces firm value. As Tobin’s Q involves market expectations, 
this variable will react immediately to any changes in PercentBankers, and the reaction will 
possibly even precede the cause if such a change is anticipated. Then it is possible that the test 
picks up a Granger causality from Tobin’s Q to PercentBankers even though the true 
causality runs in the opposite direction. We therefore need to be cautious when interpreting 
the Granger causality regressions. 
Other methods that are often used to tackle endogeneity in the literature do not work in our 
setting. The most obvious choice is instrumental variables regressions, but these regressions 
are only as good as the instruments used and all the variables in our analysis can be easily 
argued to be endogenous. We experimented with firm age and the distance of a firm’s 
headquarters to Frankfurt, where most banks are based, but age seems to proxy for many 
unobserved factors and distance turns out to be a weak instrument. We also tried to take 
advantage of the tax law change in a differences-in-differences approach, but this change has 
a direct effect only on banks’ equity holdings but not on their representation on the 
supervisory board.
An obvious way to measure the impact of bankers on firm value is an event study of the effect 
of adding a banker to the board. We also followed this approach, but it did not yield any 
robust results because the appointment of a new banker is not a major news event. In most 
cases, the proposed new appointments are listed in the proxy statement, which usually 
includes a lot of further contaminating news. If a director must be replaced between two 
annual general meetings, the firm proposes a new director to the local court, and the court 
then checks a number of formal criteria. In the few cases where there are press 
announcements, these are dated from after the court’s decision, and it appears unreasonable to 
assume that the market did not learn about the pending appointment earlier. 
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4. When do banks get involved? 
We first address the question when banks are represented on the supervisory boards of non-
financial German firms, so our dependent variable in Table IV is the percentage of bankers on 
the firm’s supervisory board. We run Tobit regressions with year and industry dummies 
(models (1) and (2)) and OLS regressions with year and firm dummies (models (3) and (4)). 
Using a Tobit model here is appropriate because about half of the observations are censored at 
zero. However, Tobit models with firm fixed effects are biased and inconsistent when the 
time dimension is small, so we use OLS in the specifications with firm fixed effects. The table 
also shows two Tobit regressions with the lagged dependent variable as additional 
explanatory variable (models (5) and (6)). 
Insert Table IV here. 
Our analysis in Table IV yields some evidence for the capital markets expertise hypothesis. 
This hypothesis implies that companies that rely more on debt and that have higher funding 
requirements try to attract more bankers to their boards. If we assume that faster growing 
companies are also those with larger funding needs, then the positive and significant 
coefficient on SalesGrowth in specifications (3) to (6) can be explained by fast growing 
companies attempting to recruit directors to their boards who help them to reduce the costs of 
external financing. Predictions for Tobin’s Q are ambiguous. Higher values for Tobin’s Q 
may reflect that firms have more growth options and therefore more need for external capital, 
so that we would expect a positive coefficient on Tobin’s Q under the capital markets 
expertise hypothesis. However, low values for Tobin’s Q may also identify low performance 
firms that are more in need of external expertise, which would suggest a negative coefficient. 
Our coefficient estimates are not consistent across specifications and can therefore not lend 
support to either interpretation. To the extent that funding requirements are related to (past) 
capital expenditure, we should also see a positive relationship between CapEx and 
PercentBankers, but we find significant results here only for specifications (3) and (4) with 
firm fixed effects. If the expertise on negotiating and pricing debt contracts is important, then 
we should see more bankers on the boards of more highly levered firms (Booth and Deli, 
1999), but the coefficient on LeverageMarket is never significant. Overall, we find limited 
evidence that is consistent with the capital markets expertise hypothesis. 
We also find some evidence for the debt selling hypothesis, which implies that bankers seek 
representation on the boards of companies that have large underutilized debt capacity. 
According to this hypothesis, bank representation should be higher for large, low-risk 
companies that have a large proportion of tangible assets. We find that size as measured by 
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sales has a highly significant positive impact on bank representation on the board in all 
specifications. Also, the negative relationships between Volatility and PercentBankers, which 
is significant in the two firm fixed effects regressions, is consistent with the debt selling 
hypothesis. The proportion of intangible assets is insignificant in all specifications. The 
significant positive effect of LeverageBanks on PercentBankers in two of the three 
specifications in Table IV is not conclusive because it is not clear whether bankers can leave 
after they have successfully sold their loans or if they must stay in order to make sure that 
their bank maintains its position if the debt matures and must be rolled over. Hence, some 
predictions of the debt selling hypothesis are borne out by our findings. 
Table IV contains very little (and mixed) evidence for the debt monitoring hypothesis. If 
bankers seek representation on the board in order to monitor existing loans, then we should 
see more bankers on the boards of those companies that use more bank loans, that are riskier 
and have a higher likelihood to enter financial distress, and where recovery in case of 
financial distress would be more difficult. Bank lending as measured by LeverageBanks is 
indeed significantly positively related to the percentage of bankers on the board in two out of 
three specifications in Table IV. The likelihood of financial distress should increase with 
volatility and decrease with interest cover. We find that the coefficients on Volatility are 
significantly negative in the two firm fixed effects regressions, which contradicts the debt 
monitoring hypothesis. The coefficients on InterestCover are statistically insignificant. 
Finally, the possibility to recover assets in case of financial distress should be associated with 
the tangibility of the assets, which we measure by the proportion of the assets that are 
intangible, but Intangibles is insignificant in all specifications. 
Finally, we find mixed evidence for the equity monitoring hypothesis which predicts that 
bankers should be represented on those boards where their banks also hold significant equity 
stakes and that they engage more in underperforming companies with lower valuations, as 
these companies seem to indicate a stronger need for intervention by their owners. Hence, we 
should see a negative association between the appointment of a banker and Tobin’s Q. Table 
IV shows that the coefficients on BankEquity are significantly positive in the two Tobit 
specifications (1) and (2), although the relation is insignificant in the remaining four 
specifications. If bankers act in the interest of equity holders, other block holders should be 
happy to have a banker on the board, but the highly significant negative coefficient on 
NonBankEquity in specifications (1) to (4) suggests that this is not the case. This can be 
interpreted as indirect evidence against the equity monitoring hypothesis. If banks are 
concerned about their equity investments, then they should seek representation on those 
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boards where firm valuation is lower. In our regressions, we measure this by the cross effect 
of TobinsQ and BankEquity which is significantly positive in specifications (1), (2), and (4). 
This implies that banks get involved in those firms they have invested in that have high
Tobin’s Q and this directly contradicts the equity monitoring hypothesis. Alternatively, poor 
performance may be related to past stock returns and we ran all our regressions again with last 
year’s stock return instead of Tobin’s Q (results not tabulated). The coefficient on stock 
returns is consistently negative in all specifications, but significant only once at the 10% level. 
More importantly, the cross effect of past stock return with BankEquity is always positive and 
significantly so in the specifications that correspond to (4), (5), and (6) in Table IV, which 
again contradicts the equity monitoring hypothesis. 
We also split the sample into two periods, 1994-1999 and 2000-2005, and find some 
noteworthy differences between the two periods regarding the equity monitoring hypothesis 
(results not tabulated). For the first period, we find results similar to those for the combined 
sample in Table IV. In the latter period (2000-2005), however, BankEquity is significantly 
positively related to PercentBankers not only in the Tobit regression, but also in the Granger 
causality regression. Many banks sold their equity stakes in non-financial firms after the 
capital gains tax reform in 2001 (see Table III) and then often withdrew their representatives 
from the board. The coefficient on the cross effect between BankEquity and LogTobinsQ
remains significantly positive in the 2000-2005 subperiod, which contradicts the equity 
monitoring hypothesis. 
5. What do bankers on the board do? 
5.1 BANKERS ON BOARDS AS CAPITAL MARKETS EXPERTS? 
Several studies in the literature argue that if bankers are appointed to the boards of non-
financial companies as capital market experts, then they should help firms to obtain the 
necessary financing more easily. We first investigate whether bankers on the board help firms 
to obtain better access to debt in general or bank debt in particular. Table V shows OLS 
regressions of LeverageMarket and LeverageBanks on PercentBankers and seven additional 
control variables. The regressions without lagged dependent variables show that there is a 
significant positive correlation between bank representation and both measures of leverage. In 
the Granger causality regressions, however, the coefficient on PercentBankers is only 
significant at the 10% level for LeverageMarket and insignificant for LeverageBanks. Tables 
IV and V therefore show that firms that rely more on debt and in particular on bank debt are 
more likely to have bankers on their boards. However, we cannot make any statement 
regarding the direction of causality. 
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Insert Table V here. 
Access to (bank) debt financing will be most valuable in years in which firms experience 
financial difficulties (see Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990). We therefore also include 
InterestCover as a measure of financial strength in the regressions in Table V, and the cross 
effect of InterestCover with PercentBankers. If bankers facilitate debt financing in difficult 
times, the coefficient on this cross effect should be negative and this is indeed the case in the 
regressions without a lagged dependent variable. While this finding is consistent with the 
capital markets expertise hypothesis, we again cannot show causality. In Table VII further 
below, we also look at the debt obtained from the same bank that is represented on the board 
and obtain similar results. We can conclude that distressed firms receive more loans from the 
banks that are represented on their boards, but we cannot show that these banks were already 
represented on the board before the additional debt financing had been obtained. The evidence 
is consistent with the alternative explanation that the bank receives a board seat when the firm 
receives a loan, possibly as a condition. 
A limitation of our analysis of leverage measures in Table V is that lower leverage is not 
necessarily a sign of being financially constrained. We therefore now turn to regressions of 
capital expenditure on cash flows and ask whether bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flows. The argument relies on the assumption that if companies are 
financially constrained, then their capital expenditure should be responsive to their own cash 
flows (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988, and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1991). 
By contrast, if they are unconstrained, then cash flows and investment levels should be 
uncorrelated.
13
 This is a broader test of the capital markets expertise hypothesis as it is not 
limited to debt financing. 
Insert Table VI here. 
Table VI performs standard tests of the investment-cash flow sensitivity, where we regress 
investment levels on cash flows, a number of controls, and an interactive coefficient of 
CashFlow with PercentBankers. This interactive coefficient should be negative for financially 
constrained firms, so that more bankers on the board reduce the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flows. We follow the literature and argue that firms are more financially constrained if 
                                                          
13  This argument is not uncontroversial. Alti (2003) shows that even in a standard neoclassical investment 
model without financial constraints there can be a correlation between investment levels and cash flows 
because cash flows reveal information about the productivity of future investments, so that companies with 
higher cash flows tend to invest more. 
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they have smaller dividend payouts.
14
 We therefore partition the sample into those firms 
whose payout ratio is above the median and those whose payout ratio is below the median of 
the sample. We repeat this analysis for the two subperiods 1994-1999 and 2000-2001, and 
Table VI shows our results.
For the full sample period 1994-2005, we do not find any significant results: all the interactive
coefficients are insignificant, and they do not differ significantly between the two subsamples. 
There is also no evidence that bank representation has a direct effect on capital expenditures. 
When we look at the two subperiods, however, we find a significant difference in the cross 
effect CashFlow*PercentBankers between constrained and unconstrained firms for both 
subperiods. For the 1994-1999 subsample, bankers on the board facilitate financing and 
investment for financially constrained firms. For the 2000-2005 sample however, we obtain 
the opposite signs, which implies that bankers increase their lending to financially 
unconstrained firms rather than to constrained firms. Under one interpretation, German firms 
had many growth options in the earlier period, which they could not finance internally, so that 
they were constrained. By comparison, they had only few growth options in the latter period, 
where they were unconstrained. Under another interpretation, this result is consistent with the 
debt-selling hypothesis. Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find the same signs in their U.S. 
sample as we do in our 2000-2005 subsample, so Table VI can be seen as another indication 
that the German system of corporate governance has converged to the Anglo-Saxon model. 
Altogether, we cannot infer any consistent evidence from Table VI that would support the 
capital markets expertise hypothesis. 
5.2 BANKERS ON BOARDS AS SALES AGENTS? 
We investigate three aspects of the notion that bankers may act as sales agents for their bank. 
We first investigate if bankers persuade the companies on whose boards they are represented 
to take on more debt and, more specifically, debt from the bank they are representing. We 
then look at the debt provided by a bank to an industry and ask whether board representation 
in an industry helps to acquire industry expertise and to sell more debt to other firms in the 
industry. Finally, we investigate if bankers sell M&A advisory services to companies through 
their board representation. 
Insert Table VII here. 
                                                          
14  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that payout policy and size may be poor proxies for financial constraints 
and develop an index of financial constraints for the U.S., but no similar index is available for Germany. 
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In Table VII, we consider individual bank-firm relations in more detail and turn to regressions 
of bank-firm-year observations in order to investigate the debt selling hypothesis. The table 
displays results of five Tobit regressions of FirmBankDebti,j,t, the debt provided by bank j to 
firm i in year t. The independent variables are the lagged dependent variable,  
FirmBankDebti,j,t-1, the dummy ThisBankOnBoardi,j,t-1, which equals one if bank j has a 
banker on the board of firm i in year t–1, the dummy AnotherBankOnBoard i,j,t-1, which 
indicates whether a bank other than j has a banker on the board of firm i, and a number of 
controls that describe firm i in more detail. As the controls do not vary across the ten banks 
within one firm-year section, we report robust standard errors with firm-year clusters for the 
Tobit specifications in Table VII.
15
All specifications in Table VII indicate that a given bank sells more debt to firms where it is 
represented on the board and less to firms where another bank is represented on the board. 
This effect is highly significant except in the Granger causality regression (5) with year, 
industry, and bank fixed effects, where ThisBankOnBoard becomes insignificant. This last 
regression sets the highest hurdle for finding significant results, so it is not surprising that we 
lose significance here. The fixed effects regressions (1) and (2) show that there is a positive 
relation between bank representation and lending of the same bank (even if we control for the 
identity of firm and bank), while regression (3) and (4) show that (Granger) causality runs 
from bank representation to lending. Note that the negative effect of AnotherBankOnBoard
remains significant in all specifications. We therefore conclude that there is compelling 
evidence that banks on the board of non-financial firms increase lending to these firms and to 
some extend replace other banks as lenders. 
Having bankers on the board who try to sell their own bank’s debt need not be detrimental to 
the firm as the terms of these loans might be preferential. We do not have any data about the 
terms of the loans provided, but Table VII contains some indirect evidence: NonBankEquity 
has a significant negative effect on FirmBankDebt in all specifications. This finding might 
simply be due to the fact that firms with non-bank block holders generally have lower 
leverage (see Table V), possibly because these firms have better access to equity financing. 
Alternatively, it can be interpreted as an indication that debt sold through bankers on the 
board is not in the interest of the firm and is restricted if non-bank block holders are present. 
Table VII also contains some evidence for the capital markets expertise hypothesis. In 
specification (1), the cross effect of InterestCover and ThisBankOnBoard has a highly 
                                                          
15  We have only 10 banks left here because of the merger that created HypoVereinsbank. 
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significant effect on FirmBankDebt, but this effect is insignificant in the remaining 
regressions. We obtain the same result if we use PayoutRatio or ROA as an indicator of 
financial difficulty instead of InterestCover (not shown in the tables). So in bad times firms 
that have bankers on their boards also hold more debt from the banks represented on the 
board, but our results are silent regarding the direction of causality. 
It could also be that banks seek appointments to supervisory boards to gain industry
expertise and lending possibilities that are industry-specific, for example because lending 
prospects are sensitive to industry cycles. This hypothesis implies that a bank’s representation 
on the boards within an industry is positively related to future lending of this bank to firms in 
this industry. To the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been formulated or tested 
in the literature before.
16
 We therefore repeat our analysis from Table VII on the bank-
industry level and average FirmBankDebt across those firms within each industry-year where 
the bank considered is not represented on the board of directors. This yields our new variable 
IndustryBankDebtk,j,t, which is the average bank debt (scaled by total assets) that bank j
provides to those firms in industry k in year t, where bank j has no representative on the board. 
Table VIII shows the results of four Tobit regressions of IndustryBankDebt on 
PercentBankers-ThisBankk,j,t, the average proportion of board seats held by bank j in industry 
k and year t. The regressions include six additional, firm-specific variables that are all 
averaged across firms in each industry-year, and regressions (2) to (4) also include the lagged 
dependent variable. 
Insert Table VIII here. 
The coefficient on PercentBankersThisBank is always positive and statistically highly 
significant in two of the four specifications in Table VIII. In the specifications that involve 
bank dummies, however, the effect is insignificant. In contrast to Table VII, results also 
become insignificant in the bank fixed effects regression (1) without a lagged dependent 
variable. In our robustness checks (not shown in the tables), we obtain somewhat stronger 
results: If we consider only firm-year observations with German GAAP reporting, 
specification (1) becomes significant, and if we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers
as an indicator of bank involvement, all specifications are significant at least at the 10% level. 
Altogether, we find some evidence for the industry expertise hypothesis. 
                                                          
16  Mintz and Schwartz (1985) observe that banks in the U.S. seek board seats on other firms much more than 
non-financial companies and argue that the main function of these board representations is to provide the 
banks with sufficient intelligence about the lending conditions in the economy. However, they do not analyze 
any industry relationships and the later literature has not picked up their suggestion. Kroszner and Strahan 
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Finally, we turn to the hypothesis that bankers sell M&A advisory services to the firms on 
whose boards they are represented. In contrast to the United States, banks in Germany have 
always been universal banks that include investment banking divisions. From SDC Platinum,
we collect data on 4,097 acquisitions undertaken by 115 of the non-financial firms in our 
sample. For only 67 acquisitions undertaken by 28 sample firms is the advisor also one of the 
sample banks; most acquisitions are small and therefore done without an advisor. We delete 
all firm-year observations without any acquisition and construct the variable 
PercentAcqAdvisori,j,t as the number of acquisitions of firm i in year t, where bank j was hired 
as the advisor, scaled by the total number of acquisitions for this firm-year. In Table IX, we 
regress PercentAcqAdvisor on ThisBankOnBoard and four other firm-specific control 
variables. Specification (1) does this for all banks in our sample. In specifications (2) and (3), 
we separately consider those two banks that have a large investment banking business, i.e. 
Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank. We use robust standard errors clustered at the firm-year 
level to compute significance levels for specification (1). 
Insert Table IX here. 
In all specifications, we observe a significant and positive relationship between bank 
representation and PercentAcqAdvisor, even though the number of uncensored observations is 
small in each case (15 for Dresdner Bank, 32 for Deutsche Bank). We can safely conclude 
that bankers on the boards of large, non-financial firms successfully promote the M&A 
advisory services of their employer. 
5.3 BANKERS ON BOARDS AS MONITORS? 
We have discussed the potential role of bankers on the boards as monitors of their equity 
interests or of their interests as creditors in Section 4 and found no evidence that either 
version of the monitoring hypothesis might explain why bankers join the boards of non-
financial companies. However, they may still act as monitors once they are appointed to these 
boards. We therefore investigate how bankers affect the investment behavior and financial 
policies of firms. 
Insert Table X here. 
Table X shows regressions that address the influence of bank representation on the payout 
ratio and on volatility. The equity monitoring hypothesis postulates that bankers on the 
board pursue the interests of their banks as equity-holders. In order to investigate this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2001) argue that banks learn through their lending relationships and then use this knowledge in the 
companies where they sit on the board. 
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hypothesis more directly, we split PercentBankers into those bankers that represent equity 
interests on the board (PercentBankersWithEquity) and those bankers on the board whose 
bank does not have an equity interest in the company at the same time 
(PercentBankersWithoutEquity). We should then see that banks that also own equity use their 
influence to increase the payout ratio and to shift risk and thereby increase volatility. There is 
virtually no evidence for this in Table X. The coefficient on PercentBankersWithEquity is 
always insignificant, and BankEquity becomes significant only once (specification (1)) and 
then with the opposite sign compared to what we would expect. A potential reason for the 
insignificant results for Volatility is that the leverage of our sample companies is not high 
enough (the median of LeverageMarket is 24.8% from Table II) to generate significant risk 
shifting incentives for equity holders. 
The implications of the debt monitoring hypothesis for the relationship between 
PercentBankers and, respectively, PayoutRatio and Volatility, are the opposite of those 
suggested by the equity monitoring hypothesis, but most coefficients are insignificant. The 
only exception is the effect of PercentBankersWithoutEquity on Volatility, which has the 
opposite sign than expected under the debt monitoring hypothesis. Hence, we cannot find any 
support for the debt monitoring hypothesis based on these results. 
Insert Table XI here. 
In Table XI, we investigate the relationship between equity ownership and management 
compensation. Disclosure on compensation in Germany is poor by US or UK standards and 
before 2006, publicly listed companies had to disclose only the aggregate compensation of the 
management board and the supervisory board, without providing a breakdown by person or 
by compensation components. We therefore cannot evaluate pay for performance sensitivities. 
Instead, we resort to LogAvgManComp, which is the logarithm of the average total 
compensation per member of the management board. These data are available only from 1997 
onwards, so the number of observations for our regressions is somewhat reduced. 
Table XI shows that the impact of bankers on average management compensation is negative 
if these bankers represent equity interests on the board, but this effect is significant at the 10% 
level only in specification (2). All other bankers, whose supervisory board seats are not 
associated with equity ownership, have an insignificant impact on average management 
compensation. The difference between the coefficients on PercentBankersWithEquity and 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity is statistically significant at the 10% level in the Granger 
causality regression (3) (the p-values are reported at the bottom of Table XI). This implies 
that managerial pay decreases in firms where bankers with equity interests are on the board 
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compared to firms where bankers without equity interests are on the board. Note that 
NonBankEquity has a highly significant negative effect on average compensation in all 
specifications. This suggests that lower compensation does not reflect lower managerial skills 
but rather lower managerial rents. Altogether, the equity monitoring hypothesis has some 
explanatory power here, but only for the minority of bankers who actually represent equity 
interests. 
6. The value of having a banker on the board 
Our final question addresses the relationship between bank representation on the board and 
firm performance, where we use Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) as performance 
measures.
17
 Some of our hypotheses have ambiguous implications for the relationship 
between bank representation and firm value. Relaxing financial constraints may move 
investment levels closer to or further away from their optimum, depending on agency costs. 
Debt monitoring may reduce adverse selection costs, which increases the value of the firm, or 
reduce payouts, which has the opposite effect. However, monitoring equity interest should 
unambiguously improve performance, whereas bankers who promote their own business are 
probably more likely to have a negative impact on firm value. 
Table XII regresses LogTobinsQ on PercentBankers, ownership variables, and a range of 
controls. Here it is conventional to also control for some value drivers (productivity, sales 
growth, R&D), although we are not convinced by this approach for our purpose. Ultimately, if 
bank representation on the board affects valuation, then it has to affect some value driver 
(such as profitability or growth), and for our question the precise transmission channel is of 
secondary importance. Therefore, if we control for value drivers, then we control to some 
extent for the effect we are trying to measure. Our preferred specifications are therefore 
models (1), (3), and (5) in Table XII, but we include the regressions with more controls (2), 
(4), and (6) for better comparison with the literature. As R&D expenditures need not be 
reported according to German GAAP, we set this item equal to zero if it is missing. In Table 
XIII, we repeat this analysis with ROA instead of LogTobinsQ as the dependent variable. 
Insert Tables XII and XIII here. 
Specifications (1) and (2) in both tables show that there is a significant negative relation 
between bankers on the board and firm performance. This result is reflected in specifications 
(1) and (2) in Table IV, where we regress PercentBankers on LogTobinsQ. In the firm fixed 
                                                          
17  For Switzerland, another universal banking country, Tobin’s Q is not significantly correlated with the 
presence of bankers on the board (Loderer and Peyer, 2002). 
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regressions (3) and (4) in Tables XII and XIII, however, PercentBankers is insignificant, 
which implies that the negative relationship only holds between firms but not necessarily 
within firms. In the Granger causality regression (5) in Table XIII, PercentBankers has a 
negative effect on ROA that is significant at the 10% level. With the additional controls in 
regression (6), this effect becomes insignificant. Here, the additional control LeverageBook
becomes significant, and from Table V we know that bankers have a positive effect on 
leverage.
18
 Hence, Table XIII provides weak evidence that bank representation Granger 
causes lower firm performance. 
The result of the Granger causality regressions for Tobin’s Q in Table XII is puzzling. This 
result persists in all our robustness checks with the only exception that it becomes 
insignificant in the 2000-2005 subsample (not shown in the table). At face value, it implies 
that PercentBankers has a significant negative effect on LogTobinsQ. However, note that 
Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure. So, with efficient markets Tobin’s Q should adjust 
immediately if there is causality from bank representation to Tobin’s Q, so that 
PercentBankerst-1 should have no impact on LogTobinsQt if we control for the lagged value 
LogTobinsQt-1. There are two possible ways to interpret the negative effect of PercentBankers
on LogTobinsQ in Table XII (specifications (5) and (6)) and the insignificant effect of 
LogTobinsQ on PercentBankers in Table IV (specifications (5) and (6)). First, if the market 
does not immediately and fully incorporate the information of a new board appointment, the 
evidence suggests that bank representation indeed causes lower Tobin’s Q. Alternatively, the 
appointment of bankers could be forward looking, so that firms that expect lower Tobin’s Q 
appoint bankers (presumably to improve performance) or bankers choose firms with lower 
expected Tobin’s Q. This second interpretation also presupposes that the market does not 
correctly infer the information contained in the appointment of a banker. The evidence is not 
consistent, however, with the hypothesis that performance first deteriorates and bankers are 
then appointed to the board. So while we cannot distinguish the direction of causality 
econometrically, we consider the possibility that bankers are generally appointed when low 
performance is anticipated but not when low performance occurs as rather remote. We 
therefore interpret Tables XII and XIII as weak evidence that bankers on the boards of non-
financial firms have a negative effect on performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
The size of this effect is substantial: For a board with average size of seven, the decrease in 
                                                          
18  These results are robust if we include three lags of the dependent variable or if we consider observations with 
German GAAP reporting only. However, if we use BankDummy instead of PercentBankers or if we consider 
the two periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005 separately, the impact of bank presence on ROA becomes 
insignificant in the Granger causality regressions (5) and (6), although it remains significant in the OLS 
regressions (1) and (2).  
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ROA caused by an additional banker ranges from 0.4 to 1.1 percentage points while Tobin’s 
Q decreases by 1.9% to 8%. 
7. Conclusions
This paper analyses the network of cross shareholdings and board representations between 
banks and non-banks in Germany between 1994 and 2005. We discuss three main hypotheses, 
namely that bankers monitor firms, that they provide capital markets expertise, and that they 
promote their own business. We cannot find much evidence for the hypothesis that bankers 
are on the boards of other firms as monitors, neither as lenders nor as equity holders. In fact, 
by the end of our sample period, banks are not owners of any significant equity interests 
anymore. In contrast, we find some evidence that bankers are on the boards of non-financial 
firms as capital market experts and that they help these firms to overcome financial 
constraints. Our strongest results, however, suggest that bankers on the board successfully 
promote their employer’s business: 
• Banks sell more debt to firms where they are represented on the board, and somewhat 
less debt to firms where other banks are represented on the board. 
• Banks also sell more debt to firms in industries where they hold more board seats, 
even to firms where they are not represented on the board. This implies that bankers 
gain important information through their board memberships and that they use this 
industry expertise to increase their lending to the whole industry. 
• Banks that are represented on the board are more likely to be chosen as M&A advisor 
if the firm undertakes an acquisition. 
Consistent with these findings, we find evidence that suggests a negative causal effect of the 
presence of a banker on the firm’s board on firm performance. Our results make us critical of 
the ability of German banks to use the power of their proxy voting rights to have their own 
managers elected to the boards of non-financial companies. This arrangement gives banks the 
power to influence non-financial firms without having any equity incentives themselves. 
Minority shareholders can evidently not overcome their collective action problem, while 
bankers use their board seats to promote their own business. 
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Table I.  Definitions of variables used in the study 
This table defines all variables at the firm-year level used in this paper. Board data are taken from 
Hoppenstedt company profiles, accounting data from Worldscope and market data from Datastream. The 
numbers in brackets refer to Worldscope items, taken from the Worldscope Data Definition Guide. Bank debt 
data was provided by Deutsche Bundesbank, it includes all individual (sample) bank-firm credit relations that 
exceed €1.5 million. 
Variable Description 
AvgManComp. Total management board compensation divided by the number of managers (in thousand 
€) (Hoppenstedt)
BankDebt Total volume of credit relations between the respective firm and all sample banks that 
exceed €1.5m (Deutsche Bundesbank)
BankDummy = 1 if one or more members of the company’s supervisory board are classified as Bankers 
(Hoppenstedt). A director is classified as a “banker” if she currently is or previously was a 
member of the management board of one of the banks in our sample. A former banker is 
not classified as a banker any longer if she becomes member of the management board of a 
non-bank in our sample. 
BankEquity Sum of all voting blocks held by banks (Hoppenstedt)
BoardSize Number of supervisory board members appointed by shareholders (Hoppenstedt)
CapEx = Capital expenditure [04601] / total assets [02999] 
CashFlow = (Earnings before extraordinary items [01751] + depreciation [01151]) / total assets 
[02999] 
FreeFloat = 1 – BankEquity – NonBankEquity
Intangibles = Intangible assets [02649] / total assets [02999] 
InterestCover = EBIT [18191] / interest expense on debt [01251] 
LeverageBanks = BankDebt / (total debt [03255]+ market capitalization [08001]) 
LeverageBook = Total debt [03255] / (total debt + common equity [03501]) 
LeverageMarket = Total debt [03255] / (total debt + market capitalization [08001]) 
MarketCap = Market capitalization [08001] 
NonBankEquity Sum of all voting blocks held by non-banks (Hoppenstedt)
PayoutRatio = Common dividends (cash) / Net Income after preferred [08256] 
PercentBankers Number of Bankers on the supervisory board divided by BoardSize (Hoppenstedt). See 
BankDummy for a definition of a banker. 
PercentBankers 
WithEquity 
Number of Bankers on the supervisory board that come from banks which do hold voting 
blocks, divided by BoardSize (Hoppenstedt)
PercentBankers 
WithoutEquity 
Number of Bankers on the supervisory board that come from banks which hold no voting 
blocks, divided by BoardSize (Hoppenstedt)
Productivity = Net sales or revenues [01001] / number of employees [07011] 
R&D = Research and Development expenditure [01201] / total assets [02999] 
ROA Return on Assets: EBITt [18191] / {(total assetst [02999] + total assetst-1)/2}
Sales = Net sales or revenues [01001] 
SalesGrowth = (net salest [01001] – net salest-1) / net sales t-1
TobinsQ = (market capitalization [08001] + total assets [02999] – common equity [03501]) / total 
assets
TotalAssets = total assets [02999] 
Volatility Standard deviation of daily excess returns (from market model) over the preceding 
calendar year (own computations; data from Datastream)
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Table II.  Summary statistics 
This table displays descriptive statistics for 27 variables used in our analysis. Board data are taken from 
Hoppenstedt company profiles, accounting data from Worldscope, and market data from Datastream. Bank 
debt data was provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, it includes all individual (sample) bank-firm credit 








AvgMan.Comp. ('000 €) 1051 833.6 636.0 645.0 5.0 5,676.6 
BankDebt (in million €) 1367 377.5 79.5 767.1 0 8,395.2 
BankDummy 1388 0.46 0.00 0.50 0 1 
BankEquity 1388 3.3% 0.0% 9.3% 0.0% 91.0% 
BankEquity if BankEquity>0 251 18.3% 13.2% 14.3% 0.5% 91.0% 
BoardSize 1388 7.06 6 2.13 2 15 
CapEx 1328 0.071 0.056 0.064 0 0.680 
CashFlow 1338 0.090 0.090 0.070 -0.291 0.950 
Intangibles 1332 0.091 0.042 0.116 0 0.754 
InterestCover 1336 15.365 3.961 59.434 0 858.672 
LeverageBanks 1279 0.146 0.067 0.251 0 3.042 
LeverageBook 1324 0.379 0.379 0.239 0 0.996 
LeverageMarket 1296 0.274 0.248 0.211 0 0.980 
MarketCap (in million €) 1296 4,850 780 12,293 4 213,794 
NonBankEquity 1388 53.8% 56.0% 32.1% 0.0% 100.0% 
PayoutRatio 1139 31.8% 29.9% 25.7% 0.0% 99.9% 
PercentBankers 1388 8.8% 0.0% 10.9% 0.0% 50.0% 
PercentBankersWithEquity 1388 2.0% 0.0% 7.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity 1388 6.0% 0.0% 9.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Productivity ('000 €/employee) 1333 237 177 332 32 7,988 
R&D 1338 0.020 0.000 0.036 0 0.231 
ROA 1321 7.9% 6.8% 8.2% -44.9% 67.1% 
Sales (in million €) 1338 8,219 1,910 17,987 13 162,384 
SalesGrowth 1322 9.7% 5.4% 81.5% -94.8% 2,840.4% 
TobinsQ 1282 1.54 1.24 1.03 0.67 12.53 
TotalAssets (in million €) 1338 9,664 1,405 25,427 24 206,985 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table IV.  Determinants of the percentage of bankers on the board 
The table presents results for Tobit and OLS regressions with PercentBankers as dependent variable. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. See Table I for a definition of all variables. For each explanatory 
variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero 
slope.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method Tobit OLS Tobit 
Lagged PercentBankers     1.1595 1.1570 
    (39.98) (39.74) 
BankEquity 0.2401 0.2077 -0.0016 -0.0192 0.0500 0.0502 
(2.85) (2.45) (-0.04) (-0.46) (1.23) (1.23) 
NonBankEquity -0.0823 -0.0778 -0.0553 -0.0534 -0.0057 -0.0059 
(-3.88) (-3.68) (-4.58) (-4.49) (-0.55) (-0.57) 
LogSales 0.0444 0.0438 0.0286 0.0285 0.0131 0.0130 
(9.60) (9.54) (5.28) (5.36) (5.80) (5.80) 
CapEx 0.1021 0.1383 0.0899 0.0864 0.0619 0.0679 
(1.06) (1.44) (1.98) (1.92) (1.31) (1.43) 
Intangibles 0.0320 0.0731 -0.0310 -0.0143 -0.0315 -0.0229 
(0.50) (1.14) (-0.87) (-0.41) (-1.01) (-0.73) 
Volatility -0.0303 -0.0380 -0.0378 -0.0408 -0.0292 -0.0263 
(-0.70) (-0.89) (-2.53) (-2.67) (-1.39) (-1.26) 
LeverageMarket 0.0233  0.0215  0.0186  
(0.64)  (1.29)  (1.04)  
LeverageBanks  0.0684  0.0888  0.0055 
 (2.79)  (5.79)  (0.48) 
InterestCover -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(-1.50) (-1.40) (-0.81) (-0.66) (-1.20) (-1.21) 
SalesGrowth 0.0063 0.0065 0.0038 0.0039 0.0087 0.0086 
(1.13) (1.18) (1.93) (2.01) (3.48) (3.43) 
LogTobinsQ -0.0640 -0.0603 0.0147 0.0192 0.0052 0.0003 
(-2.56) (-2.73) (1.43) (2.00) (0.41) (0.03) 
BankEquity*LogTobinsQ 0.9657 1.0543 0.2237 0.2762 -0.0327 -0.0463 
(2.62) (2.87) (1.51) (1.90) (-0.19) (-0.26) 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry Year, Firm Year, Industry 
Observations 1,133 1,122 1,133 1,122 1,133 1,122 
Uncensored observations 533 533   533 533 
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Table V.  The effect of bank representation on leverage 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with market leverage and (sample) bank leverage as dependent 
variables. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP 
dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German 
accounting standard. See Table I for a definition of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays 
the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope based on robust 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable LeverageMarket LeverageBanks 
Lagged dependent variable   0.8667   0.8595 
  (47.72)   (15.04) 
PercentBankers 0.2813 0.2510 0.0664 0.3323 0.2686 -0.0310 
(3.54) (2.64) (1.82) (1.99) (2.24) (-0.65) 
BankEquity -0.0167 -0.2112 -0.0652 0.0837 0.0046 -0.0374 
(-0.18) (-2.29) (-1.26) (0.57) (0.06) (-0.53) 
NonBankEquity -0.0635 -0.0944 -0.0213 -0.1137 -0.0159 -0.0234 
(-2.17) (-2.79) (-1.79) (-4.44) (-0.61) (-1.93) 
LogSales 0.0224 0.0409 -0.0004 0.0122 0.0242 0.0019 
(3.69) (2.99) (-0.14) (1.90) (2.23) (0.72) 
CapEx 0.1835 -0.3591 0.1117 -0.4484 -0.1119 -0.0374 
(1.46) (-3.30) (1.83) (-3.80) (-1.24) (-0.95) 
Intangibles 0.1982 0.3933 0.0288 -0.4512 0.0324 -0.0418 
(2.70) (5.08) (0.89) (-6.52) (0.74) (-1.52) 
Volatility 0.1730 -0.0025 -0.0089 0.2206 -0.0433 0.0067 
(2.30) (-0.08) (-0.41) (2.63) (-1.55) (0.34) 
InterestCover -0.00068 -0.00002 -0.00008 -0.00050 -0.00006 -0.00010 
(-4.98) (-0.52) (-3.10) (-7.77) (-1.67) (-3.18) 
InterestCover*PercentBankers -0.0209 -0.0095 -0.0015 -0.0164 -0.0051 -0.0004 














Observations 1129 1129 1126 1118 1118 1112 
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Table VI.  The effect of bank representation on capital expenditures 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with capital expenditure as the dependent variable. Results are 
shown for the full sample and for two sample split-ups. “PayoutRatio=low” is the subsample for which the 
payout ratio is smaller or equal to the sample median, while “PayoutRatio = high” is the subsample for which the 
payout ratio is larger than the sample median. Specifications (1) to (3) show the results for the full sample period 
1994-2005, while specifications (4) to (7) look at the two subperiods 1994-1999 and 2000-2005. All regressions 
also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial statements 
adhered to the local German accounting standard. See Table I for a definition of all variables. For each 
explanatory variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test 
for zero slope based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation 
of one lag (Newey-West). The table also reports the p-value of the standard t-test that the coefficients of the 
cross effect “CashFlow*PercentBankers” is identical between the two corresponding subsamples. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Period 1994-2005 1994-1999 2000-2005 
PayoutRatio PayoutRatio PayoutRatio 
Subsample Full Sample 
low high low high low high 
CashFlow 0.3076 0.3014 0.5786 0.4825 0.4039 0.1027 0.7172 
(3.14) (2.34) (4.44) (3.32) (2.54) (1.38) (2.68) 
PercentBankers 0.0232 0.0218 -0.0075 0.1182 -0.1383 -0.0256 0.2068 
(0.57) (0.42) (-0.11) (1.90) (-1.66) (-0.67) (1.93) 
CashFlow*PercentBankers -0.0696 -0.5090 0.4555 -1.2832 2.0453 0.2605 -1.9795 
(-0.14) (-0.86) (0.61) (-1.77) (2.17) (0.67) (-1.74) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0019 0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0034 0.0009 -0.0009 
(-1.25) (0.92) (-1.37) (-0.13) (-1.21) (0.32) (-0.41) 
TobinsQ -0.0014 0.0025 -0.0172 -0.0007 -0.0213 0.0035 -0.0142 
















Test of equality of cross-effect 
(p-value) 
 30.97% 0.42% 5.56% 
Observations 1267 546 547 272 273 274 274 
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Table VII.  The effect of bank representation on bank debt 
For each of the 1,118 firm-years in our sample and for each of the 10 banks in our sample, we calculate 
FirmBankDebt, i.e. the debt (scaled by total assets) provided by this bank to this firm. The table presents results 
for Tobit regressions of FirmBankDebt on the dummy variable ThisBankOnBoard, which equals one if the bank 
for which FirmBankDebt has been calculated is represented on the board. The regression also contains the 
dummy variable AnotherBankOnBoard, which equals one if another bank is represented on the board, as well as 
seven additional variables that are described in Table I. All dependent variables are lagged by one year. All 
regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates whether the financial 
statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. For each dependent variable, the table displays the 
slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. The t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors with firm-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged FirmBankDebt   0.9084 0.9060 0.7269 
  (5.01) (4.98) (4.55) 
ThisBankOnBoard 0.0146 0.0139 0.0186 0.0185 0.0037 
(8.45) (7.90) (3.43) (3.41) (1.34) 
AnotherBankOnBoard -0.0081 -0.0059 -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0035 
(-5.93) (-3.81) (-2.68) (-2.94) (-2.51) 
BankEquity 0.0130 -0.0152 0.0025 0.0020 0.0053 
(1.64) (-1.59) (0.49) (0.43) (0.94) 
NonBankEquity -0.0208 -0.0102 -0.0067 -0.0069 -0.0106 
(-7.57) (-3.09) (-2.73) (-2.63) (-3.52) 
LogSales 0.0028 0.0069 0.0028 0.0030 0.0033 
(4.05) (3.68) (4.33) (4.70) (4.43) 
CapEx -0.0318 0.0152 -0.0173 -0.0120 -0.0146 
(-2.05) (1.15) (-2.06) (-1.33) (-1.34) 
Intangibles -0.0454 0.0138 -0.0163 -0.0145 -0.0209 
(-5.66) (2.01) (-3.06) (-2.53) (-3.03) 
Volatility 0.0098 -0.0032 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0014 
(1.89) (-1.06) (-0.32) (-0.30) (0.40) 
InterestCover -0.00011 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00005 -0.00006 
(-6.65) (-3.45) (-3.37) (-3.52) (-3.87) 
InterestCover*ThisBankOnBoard -0.00057 -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00006 -0.00014 














Observations 11180 11180 11140 11140 11140 
Uncensored observations 4501 4501 4490 4490 4490 
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Table VIII.  The effect of a bank’s board representation on their lending activity to the same industry 
For each of the 132 industry-years in our sample and for each of the 10 banks in our sample, we calculate 
IndustryBankDebt, i.e. industry-year average of the debt (scaled by total assets) provided by this bank to a firm 
in this industry-year. We only average across those firms where this bank is not represented on the board. The 
table presents results for four Tobit regressions of IndustryBankDebt on PercentBankersThisBank, which is the 
industry-year average of the percentage of supervisory board seats occupied by this bank. The regressions also 
contain the lagged values of six additional variables that are averaged across each industry-year and are identical 
for each bank. See Table I for a definition of these variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the 
slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. The t-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors with industry-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged IndustryBankDebt  0.9130 0.9055 0.6845 
 (21.38) (21.04) (13.69) 
PercentBankersThisBank 0.0334 0.0735 0.0788 0.0255 
(1.17) (6.07) (6.29) (1.53) 
BankEquity 0.0196 -0.0103 -0.0035 0.0046 
(1.55) (-1.47) (-0.35) (0.44) 
NonBankEquity -0.0026 -0.0001 0.0003 -0.0006 
(-0.92) (-0.07) (0.15) (-0.26) 
LogSales 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0021 
(1.62) (-0.60) (2.01) (2.09) 
CapEx 0.0263 0.0035 0.0096 0.0152 
(1.84) (0.54) (0.88) (1.32) 
Intangibles 0.0014 -0.0033 0.0044 0.0028 
(0.16) (-1.04) (0.64) (0.38) 
Volatility -0.0074 0.0033 0.0041 0.0008 











Observations 1316 1315 1315 1315 
Uncensored observations 885 884 884 884 
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Table IX.  The effect of bank representation on mergers and acquisitions advisory 
For each of the 700 firm-years in our sample in which a firm did at least one acquisition and for each of the 10 
banks in our sample, we calculate PercentAcqAdvisor, i.e. the percentage of the acquisitions for which this bank 
was hired as an advisor. This table presents results for three Tobit regressions of PercentAcqAdvisor on the 
dummy variable ThisBankOnBoard, which equals one if the bank for which PercentAcqAdvisor has been 
calculated is represented on the board. The regressions include four additional independent variables that are 
described in Table I. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-
statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope. For model (1), the t-statistics are based on robust standard errors 
with firm-year clusters. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All banks Deutsche Bank Dresdner Bank 
ThisBankOnBoard 0.6992 0.32 0.38 
(5.15) (2.49) (2.45) 
LogSales 0.1209 0.1308 0.1073 
(3.48) (2.87) (1.87) 
CapEx 0.0003 0.4693 -2.3788 
(0.00) (0.40) (-1.03) 
Intangibles 1.0261 1.1282 0.4332 
(2.46) (2.49) (0.85) 
Volatility -1.0814 -1.2718 4.1932 
(-0.36) (-0.19) (0.64) 
Fixed Effects Year, Industry None None 
Observations 7,000 700 700 
Uncensored observations 52 32 15 
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Table X.  The effect of bank representation on payout ratio and volatility 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with payout ratio and volatility as dependent variables. All explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that 
indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See Table I for a definition 
of all variables. For each explanatory variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic of 
the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which also allow for 
autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). Additionally, the p-value of the F-test for the equality of the coefficients on 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity and PercentBankersWithEquity is displayed.  
 (1) (2) (3) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable Payout Ratio Volatility 
Lagged dependent variable   0.5710   0.0217 
  (16.96)   (4.14) 
PercentBankersWithoutEquity -0.0873 -0.1828 -0.0547 0.0042 0.0094 0.0003 
(-0.89) (-1.19) (-0.76) (1.05) (1.97) (0.15) 
PercentBankersWithEquity 0.0065 0.0741 0.0122 -0.0159 -0.0131 -0.0117 
(0.04) (0.47) (0.10) (-1.65) (-1.16) (-1.46) 
BankEquity -0.2362 -0.0453 -0.1573 0.0143 0.0059 0.0068 
(-2.14) (-0.31) (-1.62) (1.61) (0.63) (0.94) 
NonBankEquity 0.0545 -0.0672 0.0335 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0017 
(1.55) (-1.30) (1.32) (-0.03) (0.28) (-2.20) 
LogSales 0.0126 0.0445 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0012 
(1.57) (2.04) (-0.30) (-8.78) (-3.16) (-4.89) 
CapEx 0.4717 0.4255 -0.0029 -0.0049 -0.0169 -0.0053 
(3.32) (2.30) (-0.03) (-0.86) (-3.04) (-1.17) 
Intangibles 0.0819 0.2303 0.0874 0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0004 
(0.87) (1.36) (1.29) (0.88) (-0.65) (-0.17) 
Volatility -0.3624 -0.0946 -0.2609    














Test of equality of PercentBankers 
with and without equity (p-value) 
62.07% 19.39% 62.51% 6.13% 9.26% 15.93% 
Observations 968 968 848 1159 1159 1130 
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Table XI.  The effect of bank representation on management compensation 
The table presents results for OLS regressions of LogAvgManComp, the logarithm of average management 
compensation as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. See Table I for a 
definition of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, 
the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, 
which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). Additionally, the p-value of the F-test for the 
equality of the coefficients on PercentBankersWithoutEquity and PercentBankersWithEquity is displayed. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Lagged LogAvgManComp   0.5082 
  (7.96) 
PercentBankersWithout Equity 0.2392 -0.3396 0.1370 
(1.15) (-1.19) (0.87) 
PercentBankersWithEquity -0.2653 -0.9008 -0.5419 
(-0.78) (-1.86) (-1.59) 
BankEquity 0.1186 0.0664 0.2887 
(0.50) (0.31) (1.29) 
NonBankEquity -0.3473 -0.4021 -0.2036 
(-4.53) (-3.58) (-3.88) 
LogSales 0.2411 0.4024 0.1197 
(15.00) (3.43) (6.96) 
TobinsQ 0.1161 0.1090 0.0566 
(4.31) (3.06) (2.92) 
Intangibles -0.0906 0.5237 -0.0559 
(-0.49) (1.91) (-0.40) 
Volatility 0.1260 0.1130 0.0341 








Test of equality of PercentBankers 
with and without equity (p-value) 
19.84% 24.65% 6.10% 
Observations 954 954 851 
- 39 -
Table XII.  The effect of bank representation on Tobin’s Q 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with the logarithm of Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not 
shown) that indicates whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See 
Table I for a definition of all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in 
parentheses, the t-statistic of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors, which also allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged LogTobinsQ     0.8017 0.7945 
    (31.14) (30.91) 
PercentBankers -0.5019 -0.5601 0.0497 0.1035 -0.1338 -0.1409 
(-4.31) (-5.35) (0.58) (1.19) (-2.49) (-2.68) 
BankEquity -0.0967 0.0077 0.0073 0.0183 0.0138 0.0287 
(-0.97) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) (0.34) (0.68) 
NonBankEquity 0.0184 0.0258 0.1114 0.1208 0.0116 0.0202 
(0.46) (0.66) (2.50) (2.73) (0.60) (1.04) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0264 -0.0080 -0.1092 -0.1088 0.0008 0.0032 
(-2.41) (-0.81) (-3.91) (-3.76) (0.17) (0.74) 
CapEx 0.4094 0.3879 0.6703 0.5331 0.0264 0.0099 
(2.02) (1.90) (3.18) (2.99) (0.18) (0.08) 
Intangibles -0.1678 0.1818 -0.2575 -0.2054 -0.0395 -0.0157 
(-1.23) (1.20) (-1.70) (-1.35) (-0.61) (-0.23) 
Volatility -0.0661 0.0037 0.0143 0.0138 -0.0936 -0.1000 
(-0.66) (0.04) (0.27) (0.25) (-2.17) (-2.19) 
LeverageBook  -0.4539  0.0075  -0.0583 
 (-6.72)  (0.13)  (-2.05) 
Productivity  0.0001  0.0005  0.0000 
 (2.09)  (6.75)  (-0.61) 
SalesGrowth  -0.0006  -0.0055  -0.0025 
 (-0.05)  (-1.89)  (-1.25) 
R&D  1.8339  0.8161  0.4862 














Observations 1115 1102 1115 1102 1104 1101 
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Table XIII.  The effect of bank representation on ROA 
The table presents results for OLS regressions with ROA as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are 
lagged by one year. All regressions also contain a German GAAP dummy variable (not shown) that indicates 
whether the financial statements adhered to the local German accounting standard. See Table I for a definition of 
all variables. For each dependent variable, the table displays the slope estimate and, in parentheses, the t-statistic 
of the two-sided test for zero slope, based on robust heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, which also 
allow for autocorrelation of one lag (Newey-West). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged LogTobinsQ     0.5224 0.5765 
    (6.46) (9.75) 
PercentBankers -0.0720 -0.0771 -0.0312 -0.0393 -0.0379 -0.0297 
(-2.73) (-3.03) (-0.76) (-1.12) (-1.93) (-1.57) 
BankEquity 0.0045 -0.0215 0.1265 0.0646 0.0185 -0.0324 
(0.11) (-0.57) (1.51) (1.01) (0.46) (-0.84) 
NonBankEquity 0.0035 -0.0020 0.0069 0.0005 0.0030 0.0010 
(0.38) (-0.22) (0.43) (0.03) (0.43) (0.16) 
LogTotalAssets -0.0058 -0.0010 -0.0173 -0.0129 -0.0020 -0.0002 
(-2.44) (-0.47) (-1.51) (-1.00) (-1.17) (-0.11) 
CapEx 0.1172 0.1395 0.1349 0.1444 0.0128 0.0315 
(2.72) (3.32) (2.76) (3.07) (0.40) (1.01) 
Intangibles -0.0575 -0.0010 -0.0278 0.0094 -0.0414 -0.0173 
(-1.99) (-0.03) (-0.66) (0.22) (-1.95) (-0.78) 
Volatility -0.0308 -0.0194 0.0195 0.0146 -0.0137 -0.0203 
(-1.22) (-0.84) (1.00) (0.75) (-0.71) (-1.02) 
LeverageBook  -0.0990  -0.0379  -0.0342 
 (-6.60)  (-1.69)  (-2.79) 
Productivity  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000 
 (3.07)  (3.98)  (1.22) 
SalesGrowth  0.0019  0.0005  0.0006 
 (0.55)  (0.33)  (0.37) 
R&D  0.0258  -0.0509  -0.0142 
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